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.ere's a quick quiz: is housing
today more or less racially segregated
than in 1860, the first year of the Civil
War? You might be tempted to answer
"less segregated" based on the 30 years of
racial progress that has followed the
passage of major civil rights legislation in
the 1960s. Besides, you answer, surely
we live in a more racially integrated
society today than the one in which
slavery was still legal. Nevertheless, if
you answered "less segregated," you
would be wrong.
To understand this surprising result
you need a brief review of the
dissimilarity index, the standard measure
of segregation in housing. A score of 0
corresponds to perfect integration and a
score of 100 indicates absolute
segregation. The index itself is typically
interpreted as the percentage of the
minority population that would have to
move in order to achieve full integration.
The average dissimilarity index calculated
for free blacks and whites for residents in
major northern cities in 1860 showed that
about 45 percent of all blacks would have
to move in order to fully integrate the

typical city. In the South that number was
closer to 30 percent. The latest figures
from census 2000 show that in the 50
cities with the largest black populations,
the median dissimilarity index is 65. The
most segregated city in the United States,
Detroit, has a dissimilarity score of 85
(Lewis Mumford Center 2001).
Table 1 makes it clear that the intense
social isolation of racially homogeneous
ghettos is a construction of the early
industrial era. Each row shows the
dissimilarity index for selected northern
cities from 1860 to 2000. A confluence of
formal legal barriers and informal social
hostilities see Massey and Denton
(1993, Chapter 2) for a fuller discussion
of these factors caused the average
segregation level to double from 46.6 to
89.2 in the period from 1860 to 1940.
Since 1940, segregation has decreased but
at a relatively slow rate. Consider for a
moment that the average dissimilarity
index for cities in Table 1 has declined 17
points in 40 years, or about 4 points per
decennial census. At this rate of decline,
these particular cities would not reach
segregation levels lower than those in
1860 until the year 2060.
A growing number of studies suggest
that racial segregation in housing may
have a profound effect on our society. For
instance, Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
estimate that a one-standard-deviation
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decline in black/white segregation would
narrow the black/white gap in schooling
(high school and college graduation
rates), employment (labor force
participation rates and earnings), and
single parenthood by about one-third.
Recent reviews (Kain 1992; Holzer 1991)
of the spatial mismatch literature indicate
that the employment prospects of central
city residents, especially young and
unskilled laborers, have been adversely
affected by a geographic shift in the
location of entry-level jobs away from
traditionally black and Hispanic central
cities and toward typically white suburban
areas. Thus, by isolating minorities to
low-job-growth areas, racial segregation
increases spatial mismatch and
contributes to poor labor market
outcomes. Other studies have linked high
levels of racial segregation to poor
educational attainment (Orfield 1997),
increased infant and adult mortality rates
(La Viest 1993; Collins and Williams
1999), increased homicide rates (Peterson
and Krivo 1999), and even decreases in
voter turnout (Cohen 1983).
Racial segregation in housing is caused
by three principal factors: voluntary
sorting, interracial differences in socioeconomic status, and discriminatory
practices perpetuated by rental agents and
realtors. The first factor, the preferences
that people have over the racial
composition of their neighborhood, is not
directly controllable through legislation
(although its impact on segregation is
undeniable). Segregation in housing
would be of considerably less interest to
social scientists if voluntary sorting were
its only cause. When studying
segregation in housing, social scientists
typically ignore the effect of voluntary
sorting and search for empirical strategies
that allow them to quantify the impact of
either differences in socioeconomic status
or involuntary sorting caused by
discriminatory practices. Almost no
research exists to date that decomposes
black/white segregation into these three
components.
There is little evidence that the second
factor, differences in income, wealth, and
educational attainments, has a large effect
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on segregation levels. Studies that
calculate segregation indices for blacks
and whites in different income groups
report very little variation in segregation
levels as incomes rise and fall. For
instance, using data from the 1980 census,
sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy
Denton (1993) calculated the dissimilarity
index for blacks and whites with incomes
below $2,500, between $25,000-27,500,
and above $50,000 for 30 major
metropolitan areas. The average indices
by income group for the northern cities
examined were 85.8, 80.7, and 83.2,
respectively. A similar pattern held for
cities in the South. There is little
evidence that racial segregation in ,
housing is in fact a by-product of
economic stratification.

Given the deleterious effects of
segregation, public policy should
be directed at educational efforts
and enforcement measures of
fair housing laws.
The third factor, discrimination in
housing markets, is perhaps the most
important factor because it not only
substantially increases segregation but is
also amenable to policy measures.
Despite the passage of civil rights
legislation in the 1960s that granted
minorities the legal right to equal access
in housing, there is evidence that
discrimination persists. National audit
studies conducted by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development that
send pairs of black and white testers to
visit realtors and rental properties
revealed that blacks are likely to be given
less information on housing availability
than are their white counterparts in
approximately one out of every five visits.
The most egregious form of
discrimination in housing availability
telling minorities that a property is not for
rent or for sale when the white tester is
told the opposite occurs about 7 percent
of the time in the sales market and about
10 percent of the time in the rental market
(Yinger 1992).

This high incidence of discrimination
in housing markets affects segregation
through two mechanisms, one direct, the
other indirect. The direct mechanism is
the most obvious: blacks who seek
apartments or homes in white
neighborhoods often find those efforts
stymied. Minorities are more likely to
find housing in areas predominantly
populated by minorities because
information about such properties is more
readily available.
The second mechanism involves the
effect of discrimination on the search
behavior of blacks looking for homes and
apartments. Research has shown that
blacks utilize the services of realtors in
much lower numbers than whites and that
a large part of this differential is due to
the fear of experiencing discrimination
(Parley et al. 1979). Realtors are losing
business because minorities dread the
humiliation associated with
discrimination. To avoid discrimination,
minorities appear to minimize their
exposure to situations that could
potentially end in disparate treatment.
While there are few empirical studies of
housing search behavior, it is not hard to
imagine that this fear of discrimination
affects other aspects of minority search
patterns that exacerbate racial
segregation. A logical extension of
Parley's findings is the possibility that
minorities are less likely to search for
housing in predominately white areas, not
because they find those areas unappealing
per se, but because they fear the increased
likelihood of experiencing discrimination.
Given the deleterious effects of
segregation mentioned above, public
policy should be directed at educational
efforts and enforcement measures of fair
housing laws that might decrease the
incidence of discrimination, lower
involuntary segregation, and lead to a
more integrated society. Fortunately,
there are some simple measures that may
reduce both racial discrimination and
segregation in housing.
The first measure is the imple
mentation of community education
programs focusing on fair housing laws
and compliance. The second involves
using housing audits to investigate fair
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Table 1 Segregation (Dissimilarity Index) in Selected Northern Cities, 1860-2000
2000
1970
1940
1910
1860
City
Boston

61.3

64.1

86.3

79.9

65.7

Chicago

66.8

95.0

88.8

80.8

Cincinnati

50.0
47.9

47.3

90.6

83.1

74.8

Cleveland

49.0

92.0

89.0

77.3

Indianapolis

57.2

69.0
NAa

90.4

88.3

70.7

Milwaukee
New York

59.6

66.7 ;',

92.9

83.7

82.2

40.6

NA

86.8

73.0

81.8

Philadelphia
St. Louis

47.1

46.0

88.8

83.2

72.3

39.1

54.3

92,6

89.3

74.3

San Francisco

34.6

NA

82.9

55.5

60.9

Wilmington

26.1

NA

83.0

NA

53.5

Average

46.6

59.2

89.2

81.4

72.2

SOURCE: For 1860, 1910, and 1940, Massey and Denton (1993, Table 2.1, p. 21); for 1970, Mas
sey and Denton (1993, Table 2.3, p. 47); for 2000, Lewis Mumford Center press release (2001).
;
aNA = data not available.
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housing complaints. Depending on the
severity of the infractions and the strength
of the evidence, the most appropriate
result of an enforcement audit may be
either education or legal actions.
The third measure is performing audits
that measure the overall incidence of
housing discrimination in the community
and publishing the results in a widely read
forum, such as the local newspaper. The
purpose of this last measure is twofold.
First, it monitors the effectiveness of the
first two measures. If education and
enforcement activities produce the
desired results, then the overall incidence
of housing discrimination should decline
with time. Second, credible evidence that
racial discrimination in housing is
declining may induce minorities to
increase their search efforts for housing in
predominantly white areas.
Unfortunately* the effectiveness of
these measures on either search behavior
or the discrimination rate is simply
unknown. Research to date on
segregation in housing has focused on
questions such as "Does discrimination
still exist in housing markets?" and "Can
housing segregation simply be a result of

economic status?" and has left the
question of how discrimination causes
segregation largely unexplored. The
answers to basic questions, such as what
the response of segregation is with respect
to the discrimination rate, how the
discrimination rate varies under different
enforcement regimes, and whether
discrimination in housing is pro- or
countercyclical, are unknown at this time.
Given the sizable effect of segregation on
economic and social outcomes, it is
reasonable to believe that new empirical
research clarifying the relationship
between search, discrimination, and
segregation may be welcomed not only by
other social scientists, but by
policy makers as well.
Suggested readings
Collins, Chiquita, and David R. Williams.
1999. "Segregation and Mortality: The
Deadly Effects of Racism." Sociological
Forum 74(3): 495-523.
Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser.
1997. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad?"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3):
827-872.

Orfield, Gary. 1997. "Does Segregation
Help Close the Gap?" Journal of Negro
Education 66: 241-254.
Peterson, Ruth, and Lauren Krivo. 1999.
"Racial Segregation, the Concentration of
Disadvantage and Black and White
Homicide Victimization." Sociological
Forum 14(3): 465-^93.
Yinger, J. 1992. "The 1989 Housing
Discrimination Study: Results and
Implications." In Clear and Convincing
Evidence, Michael Fix and Raymond
Struyk, eds. Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press.
Kelly DeRango is a research fellow at the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
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2001 Grant Awards
The W.E. Upjohn Institute has made its
Grant Program awards for 2001 and
extends its congratulations to the
recipients. Six grants were awarded this
year. The recipients and their projects are
as follows:
Marcy Whitebook, University of
California, Berkeley: "Then and
Now: Changes in Child Care
Staffing, 1994-2000"
Wayne Vroman, The Urban Institute:
"Unemployment and Employment
Protection: An International
Analysis"
Brian Klaas and Hoyt Wheeler,
University of South Carolina:
"Workplace Justice without Unions"
John Formby, University of Alabama:
"The Minimum Wage, Earned
Income Tax Credit, Payroll Taxes,
and Poverty"
Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest,
The Urban Institute: "Leaving
Welfare: Employment and WellBeing of Families that Left Welfare
in the Post-Entitlement Era"
Western Michigan University:
Department of Economics Guest
Lecture Series 2001-2002.
Also awarded this year were 10 minigrants. The recipients and their projects
are the following:
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, San
Diego State University: "Wage
Dynamics for Temps and Perms: The
Role of Geographic Mobility"
Eric Bettinger and Robert Slonim,
Case Western Reserve University:
"The Effect of Educational Vouchers
on Academic and Non-Academic
Outcomes: Experimental Evidence
from a Natural Experiment"
Alan Durell, Dartmouth College:
"Fairness as a Constraint on Wage
Setting"

Kay Glasgow, California Polytechnic
State University: "NUEWO: New
Understanding of Employment and
Work Organization"
David Greenberg and Mark Shroder,
University of Maryland, Baltimore
County: "Proposal for a Supplement
to The Digest of the Social
Experiments'"
Brent Kreider and John Pepper,
University of Virginia: "The Effects
of Health Status and Disability
Insurance Policy on Labor Force
Participation: Reevaluating the
Existing Evidence in Light of
Reporting Errors"
'. Kevin Lang, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology: "Voluntary
Desegregation and Human Capital
Acquisition in Recipient School
Districts"
1 Robert Oxoby, University of Calgary:
"Motivating Work Teams: A
Behavioral Economic Analysis"
' Kimberlee Shauman, University of
California, Davis: "Family
Migration: Causes and Consequences
for Men and Women in Dual-Career
Couples"
Kosali Simon and Daniel
Rosenbaum, Cornell University:
"Health Benefits in the Low-Wage
Sector: The Effect of Medicaid
Expansions, Labor Market
Conditions and Rising Health
Insurance Costs."

Earle to Join Institute
John S. Earle will join the staff of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute as a senior
economist late in 2001. Prof. Earle
earned his Ph.D. from Stanford
University in 1988 and was a Fulbright
Scholar in Vienna in 1988 to 1990. He
currently holds positions at the Stockholm
School of Economics and the Central
European University, and he has been the
director of the Central European
University Labor Project since 1994.
Some of his other professional work has
been for the World Bank, the Institute for
the Study of Labor at the University of
Bonn, the Russian-European Centre for
Economic Policy, and the William
Davidson Institute at the University of
Michigan.
Earle has written widely on European
economics and is a frequent speaker at
economics conferences. He has
coauthored several books on the
economics of privatization in Central and
Eastern Europe, including Small
Privatization (London: CEI Press, 1994)
and Privatization in the Transition to a
Market Economy (London: Pinter and
New York: St. Martin's, 1993). Three of
his books have been translated and
published in several Eastern European
languages. Earle is currently working on
two new books on economics in Russia
and Eastern Europe.
Prof. Earle also has notable talents
outside the realm of economics, perhaps
foremost of which is being a concert
pianist. He received a bachelor's of music
degree in piano performance from
Oberlin College and Conservatory as part
of a double degree program in music and
economics. He has performed in Europe
and competed in the prestigious
Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in
Moscow. The Institute looks forward to
having Prof. Earle on its senior staff.

Timothy J. Bartik

An my new book, Jobs for the Poor:
Can Labor Demand Policies Help ?, I
argue that U.S. antipoverty policy would
be more effective with a more balanced
use of labor demand and supply policies.
Current U.S. policy overemphasizes labor
supply policies. The book suggests new
labor demand policies to increase both
overall labor demand and labor demand
for the poor.
Labor supply policies directly interact
with the poor to increase their labor
supply, job skills, or wages. Examples of
labor supply policies include welfare
reform, job training, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Labor
demand policies directly interact with
employers to affect the number of poor
persons hired. Examples of labor demand
policies include public works programs of
the 1930s, public service jobs funded by
the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act during the 1970s, and tax
credits for employers hiring the
disadvantaged (1970s to the present).
What are the arguments for greater use
of labor demand policies? The first is that
despite the economic boom of the 1990s,
more jobs are still needed by America's
poor. For example, in order for each poor,
non-elderly U.S. household to have one
full-time, full-year worker, we would
need 9 million more full-time, full-year
jobs. Employment rates for loweducation groups are still low compared
to past norms. For example, suppose our
goal was to increase the employment rates
of all working-age heads of households
without a college degree to the
employment rate that similar white males
experienced in 1979. Achieving this goal
would require 5 million more jobs.
A second argument for labor demand
policies is that labor supply policies by

themselves have significant limitations.
One limitation is that it is difficult or
costly (either financially or socially) for
labor supply policies to cause large
increases in the employment of the poor.
Welfare reform has pushed over a million
persons into the labor force, but 40
percent of these new labor force entrants
are not employed, which is a significant
social cost. Job training programs have
benefits that exceed their modest costs,
but their benefits are also modest (an
increase in earnings of perhaps $1000
annually per trainee). Wage supplements
to the poor such as the EITC help many
working Americans out of poverty but
usually only have modest effects in
increasing employment; for example, the
EITC has increased employment by at
most one-half million persons.
A further limitation of labor supply
policies is that they cause displacement
effects. When labor supply increases,
labor demand does not instantly go up by
the same amount. As a result, some jobs
obtained by the new labor force
participants result in fewer job openings
for others. For example, estimates
suggest that for every 10 jobs obtained by
former welfare recipients, 3 to 7 jobs are
lost by other less-educated workers.
A third argument for labor demand
policies is that aggregate demand policies
are necessary but insufficient to solve
poverty. Estimates suggest that a
1 percent lower unemployment rate will
lower the poverty rate by 0.3 percent to
0.9 percent, which would bring 0.9
million to 2.6 million people out of
poverty; yet unemployment rates cannot
be lowered sufficiently to solve poverty.
In 1999, the U.S. unemployment rate was
4.2 percent and poverty was 11.8 percent.
Even lowering unemployment to zero,

which is impossible, would not eliminate
poverty.
A fourth argument is that targeted
demand programs can be effective. Over
the years, the United States has
experimented with a number of programs
that hire targeted low-employment groups
for public service jobs or subsidized jobs
with private employers. During the
subsidy period, these programs typically
result in huge increases in employment
rates. It is common for the earnings or
employment of the target group to
increase by 60 percent or more of the
earnings and employment subsidized by
the program (Table 1). This means that
these programs are effective in identifying
individuals who otherwise would have
been jobless. These targeted demand
programs also usually yield jobs that are
productive; employers often are surprised
at the high productivity of these
subsidized hires.
Targeted demand programs can cause
significant earnings increases that persist
long after the subsidy period. For
example, the Supported Work program of
the late 1970s yielded increases in
earnings for former welfare recipients of
about 25 percent of in-program earnings
that persisted largely unchanged for at

Table 1 In-Program Impacts of
Subsidized Jobs Programs
Program

Ratio3

Supported Work (1970s)

0.79

Youth Incentive
Entitlement Pilot Projects
(1970s)

0.61

Youth Corps (1990s)

0.57

New Hope (1990s)

0.68

Summer Youth Jobs

0.67

aThis ratio shows the estimated net impact of
the program on the employment and earnings
of program participants during the period in
which subsidized employment was provided
divided by the employment or earnings
directly provided by the program.
SOURCE: Bartik, Timothy J. 2001. Jobs for
the Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies Help?
Table 7.1, p. 182.
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least eight years after the program. Why
does short-run subsidized employment
have long-run earnings effects? A
plausible explanation is that a well-run
subsidized jobs program increases
workers'"soft" job skills. Soft skills
include, for example, showing up at work
consistently and getting along with
supervisors, co-workers, and customers.
Studies suggest that problems with soft
skills explain why many disadvantaged
workers lose their jobs. Soft skills are
difficult to teach in a classroom; they are
better learned through a supportive job
experience.
What specific labor demand policies
do I recommend? First, I recommend that
the United States permanently enact a
revised version of the New Jobs Tax
Credit that was in place in 1977 and 1978.
This revised tax credit would provide
subsidies to all employers that expanded
overall employment (not just jobs for the
poor) above some baseline level if they
are located in high-unemployment local
labor markets. This subsidy would be
credited against payroll taxes (the Social
Security and Medicare trust funds would
be reimbursed from general revenues), so
the subsidy would encourage employment
expansion by all employers; for-profit,
nonprofit, and public. In periods of low
national unemployment such as we have
recently experienced, this tax credit
would only apply to the few highunemployment areas. Research shows
that geographically targeting labor
demand increases on high-unemployment
local labor markets reduces inflationary
pressures; but, if the U.S. economy went
into a prolonged recession, the revised
New Jobs Tax Credit would apply
nationwide. Studies suggest that such a
credit might offset about one-fourth of the
normal job loss caused by a recession.
Second, I recommend we adopt a
revised version of the MEED program
used by the state of Minnesota in the
1980s. Local workforce boards would, on
a discretionary basis, award wage
subsidies to selected employers that hired
selected individuals from disadvantaged
groups. The subsidies could go to either
public or private employers. To reduce
displacement of current workers, the

subsidies could only go for newly created
jobs. The subsidies would be targeted on
individuals in poverty who are unlikely to
find a steady job on their own, based on
their own past history and the results of a
trial job search. The subsidy period
would be no more than six months, which
is sufficient to provide training in soft
skills. Preference in awarding subsidies
would go to employers that can provide
good on-the-job training in both soft and
"hard" skills and that are willing to "roll
over" subsidized hires into permanent
jobs with some prospect for advancement.
Discretionary control of this program
by local boards is a crucial distinction
from our current tax subsidies to
employers hiring the disadvantaged. Our
current program is an entitlement that
goes, for example, to many restaurants for
hiring workers they would have hired
anyway. Under a discretionary program,
the wage subsidies can be more carefully
targeted on both workers and employers.
Wage subsidies should be limited to
persons unlikely to find steady work in
other ways and to employers that are
willing to change hiring practices and
provide career opportunities to those who
are hard to employ.

Running these two demand programs
at a level sufficient to make a large
difference to poverty would require tens
of billions of dollars per year in additional
government spending or tax credits.
However, no realistic antipoverty policy is
cheap. The aggregate poverty gap in the
United States the difference between
the incomes of the poor and the income
needed to be out of poverty is $65
billion annually. Are we serious in
promoting employment as a solution to
poverty? If so, we must commit the
resources needed to significantly increase
the employment and earnings of the poor.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research. Jobs for the Poor: Can Labor
Demand Policies Help? is jointly published
by the Russell Sage Foundation and the
Upjohn Institute and is available for
purchase at http://russellsage.org/
publications/titles/jobs_poor. htm. The
research for this book was supported by the
Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundations
and the Upjohn Institute. This article and
the book reflect the findings and views of
the author and may not reflect the views of
the sponsors of this research.
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The Institute publishes books on subjects of importance to policymakers,
labor economists, and practitioners who study labor market problems and
programs to address them.
The majority of the books we publish originate from our Grant Program or
from the Institute's in-house staff of professional economists. However, we also
invite submissions of publishable book-length manuscripts and proposals for
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reviewed promptly by Institute staff, and manuscripts that appear promising will
receive external anonymous peer review.
Send your manuscript or proposal to
Dr. Kevin Hollenbeck
Director of Publications
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Recent Books on Health Care
The Political
Economy of
Health Care
Huizhong Zhou, editor

The calls for health care reform are
as loud as they are persistent. A variety
of stakeholders both inside and outside
the health care industry regularly voice
their concerns
about issues such
Political
as Medicare,
Economy
managed care,
health insurance
Health Care and coverage for
Reforms_ the uninsured, and
the role of tax
policy in health
care. While
federal policymakers have so far failed
to enact sweeping legislation
addressing the nation's health care
system, significant changes affecting
health care financing, insurance, and
service delivery have occurred.
The political implications and
economic consequences of these
reforms are the subject of this new
book. The chapters, authored by a
select group of leading health
economists, provide insights valuable
for evaluating further developments in
what are sure to be ongoing and
contentious health care reform efforts.
Included are
• The Not-So-Simple Economics (and
Politics) of Medicare Reform,
Len M. Nichols
• Managed Care and Social Welfare,
Laurence Baker
• Covering the Uninsured,
Jonathan Gruber
• Health Insurance and the Labor
Market, Brigitte Madrian
• Health Care Consumer Choice,
Catherine G. McLaughlin
• Positive Economics and Dismal
Politics, Robert B. Helms
1 80 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-224-7
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-223-9 / July 2001.
Read the first chapter on our Web site.

The Economics of
Medicare Reform
Andrew J. Rettenmaier
and Thomas R. Saving

The authors propose a means for
preserving Medicare as we know it.
After detailing the reasons for
Medicare's financial troubles, they
present a pre-paid,
The
Economies - cohort-based
of : " financing plan that
represents a
fundamental
departure from the
generation-transfer
method currently
used. Their system
requires each age
cohort to contribute to accounts that,
by the time of their retirement, would
contain a large enough sum to pay for
their cohort's remaining lifetime health
care expenditures.
This method, they say, eliminates
the cohort size risk that faces us now
due to the retirement of the baby boom
generation.
"By moving to prepaid financing,"
say Rettenmaier and Saving, "we
remove the disincentives to invest, and
the nation will experience an increase
in its capital stock and income. It is
this increase in the capital stock and
national income that provides the
additional resources available to pay
off most, but not all, of the current
system's unfunded liability. There is
no free lunch," they conclude, "but
there is a considerably cheaper lunch
that is of better quality than the one we
are currently committed to buying."
190 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-212-3
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-211-5 / 2000.

Ensuring Health
and Income
Security for an
Aging Workforce
Peter P. Budetti, Richard V. Burkhauser,
Janice M. Gregory, and H. Allan Hunt,
editors

During the next two decades, the
number of older workers in the United
States will nearly
double. This
bulge, soon to be
a conspicuous
aspect of the
aging baby boom
generation, will
require a
transformation in
the way public
and private programs are designed to
support these individuals at work and
in retirement. This volume presents a
group of forward-looking papers that
explore implications of an aging
workforce for a number of social
programs in the coming decades,
while pointing to the critical policy
issues we must face when growing
numbers of older workers begin to
strain the capacity of those programs,
"[The] contributors not only cover a
wide range of issues but also analyze
recent trends that will require new
approaches which will challenge
policy makers for years to come.
;
Recommended for researchers,
professionals, faculty, and
undergraduate and graduate students
engaged in policy studies, particularly
concerning the aging workforce."
F.W. Musgrave, Choice Magazine

Read the first chapter on our Web site.

521 pp. $45 cloth ISBN 0-88099-220-4
$27 paper ISBN 0-88099-219-0 / 2001.
Read the first chapter on our Web site.

ORDER FORM
Book/Author
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